

of strivings of the monads and their power of working upon one another in their various degrees. Ward and some other moderns follow Leibnitz in making all the physical world consist of monads, differing from those which compose living organisms only in the lower level of their powers, i. e., in degree rather than in kind. Both Haldane and Whitehead may probably be classed as monadists of this group ; though neither insists on this view, rather implies it only.

However, it is suggested in Chapter IX that the psychologist and the biologist do well to avoid taking up a position in respect to this wider problem, as also to the closely allied problem of the psycho-physical relation (whether one of interaction, parallelism, identity or one-sided dependence); and proceed to build up the monadic theory of organisms in the light of a wealth of biological and psychological evidence; postponing (though not ignoring) these more ultimate questions.

We find, then, that the cell-theory of the organism inevitably suggests the monadic theory. And, but for the existence of forms of living things that seem more primitive and of simpler constitution than cells, the cell-theory would strongly support a dualistic monadic theory ; would point to the cell as the primordial animated unit. It is possible that these sub-cellular forms of life are misleading; perhaps degenerate and aberrant developments.

But if we had no cell-theory ; if we knew nothing of the anatomy of brain or body ; we should have good grounds for formulating the monadic theory of

personality, since
it is the only one which resolves an
outstanding paradox,
namely, the paradox that in spite of all the
strong grounds
for asserting the unity and wholeness of
every organism,